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Abstract  
This article uses the first domestic violence case filed against the United States in the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) to discuss the politics of 
gender and domestic violence. We discuss how gender-neutral frameworks of the case 
in the U.S. ignore the interpersonal gender and power issues which often attend              
domestic violence cases. The case before the IACHR was arguably more successful in 
addressing gender by drawing from the human rights literature on women’s rights. 
However, given that this case is the first human rights charge against the United 
States by a domestic violence survivor, the specifically gendered framework and 
unique nature of the crime could be potentially limiting for other domestic violence 
cases. We conclude by offering an alternative framework for domestic violence               
intervention in human rights cases.  
 
Key Words 
Domestic Violence, Women’s Rights, Feminist Theory, United States 
 
 By all accounts, Jessica Gonzales followed the correct                
protocol in alerting law enforcement when she feared for her                
daughters’ safety. Jessica obtained a restraining order to protect                
herself and her three daughters from her estranged husband Simon, 
who had been acting erratically since their separation. On June 22, 
1999, Simon picked up the girls at 5:15pm, and she was subsequently 
unable to reach him throughout the night. Jessica called the police 
four times and went to the police station in person at 12:40am. The 
dispatchers repeatedly told her that Simon had not violated the         
restraining order despite her fears that her daughters were in danger, 
because he had legal visitation rights to the children. One dispatcher 
went so far as to say ‘that’s a little ridiculous making us freak out and 
thinking the kids are gone’ (Lenahan v. United States 2010:19). At 
3:20am, Simon pulled up to the Castle Rock, Colorado Police Station 
and opened fire. He was killed in the shootout and officers found the 
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bodies of Leslie, Katheryn, and Rebecca Gonzales shot to death in the 
back of Simon’s truck (Lenahan v. United States 2010).  
 Following her daughters’ murders, Jessica Gonzales (now 
Jessica Lenahan) sued the town of Castle Rock, the police department, 
and three individual officers for failure to adequately enforce her               
restraining order. Both the U.S. District Court of Colorado and the 
U.S. Supreme Court argued that the Castle Rock Police Department 
and the town of Colorado had exercised due diligence in response to 
the information Gonzales provided that night and, therefore, had no 
reason to believe that Simon was a threat to his children. Following 
these two cases, Gonzales, along with the American Civil Liberties 
Union and the Human Rights Clinic, brought a petition to the                   
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (henceforth IACHR), 
making it the first individual complaint of a human rights violation 
against the United States by a domestic violence survivor (Lenahan v. 
United States 2010).  
 Calling the Gonzales case ‘the first human rights case by a    
survivor of domestic violence,’ invokes a specific image of the 
‘survivor.’ Arlene Roberts of The Huffington Post (2009) describes the 
familiar domestic violence narrative:  
 
 The unfortunate saga has played out one too many 
times. A young woman, fearing for her life at the 
hands of a spouse or live-in companion, seeks 
protection from law enforcement officials by        
obtaining an order of protection. However, the 
restraining order is not enforced and those           
intended for protection meet with a tragic end.  
 
This is a story about a specific gendered victim who ‘met a tragic end:’ 
a woman experiencing physical, emotional, sexual, and/or economic 
abuse and control by her intimate partner.  
 Statistics consistently show that abuse is a common                        
experience for American women (NISVS 2010; Tjaden and Thoennes 
2000). Caroline Bettinger-Lopez, Deputy Director of the Columbia 
Law Clinic, adds that the ‘Jessica Gonzales’ tragedy is by no means 
unique’ (2008:187). However, due to the extreme nature of this case, 
one could also maintain that it is, in fact, not ‘typical.’ We argue that 
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using the Gonzales case as a potential model for human rights may    
limit future national and international response to domestic violence 
claims because it is not representative of the majority of women’s                       
experiences of battering in the United States. Additionally, this case 
and its framework follow the historical framing of domestic violence 
claims making legitimated by a woman’s status in the family.  
 In the United States, women are thought to have rights that 
are no different from men. Women can make justice claims before the 
law, which is assumed to be impartial and unbiased. However, history 
has shown how women have been excluded from accessing certain 
rights. Human rights activists have fought to distinguish women’s 
rights as a specific kind of human rights through the creation of the 
Committee to End Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and 
United Nations-sponsored conferences in Vienna, Cairo, and Beijing. 
Women have human rights, but those rights are gendered (Merry 
2006). The Gonzales cases in domestic courts and the IACHR                   
illustrate these different understandings of women and rights. In U.S. 
courts, the main issue at hand was not violence against women per se, 
but, rather, the gender-neutral relationship of the private citizen to the 
state. The case at the IACHR focused on Gonzales’ status as a mother 
and her right to protect her children (Lenahan v. United States 2010). 
That is, the case before the IACHR conceptualized womanhood in a 
specific way and subsequent discussions privileged the relationship 
between women and the family and women and children. This article 
uses the Gonzales case as an entrée into discussions of the United 
States’ and human rights frameworks of domestic violence through 
gendered or gender-neutral claims.  
 We begin with a review of shared critiques of liberalism and 
‘moral personhood’ by Western feminist scholars and feminist                 
scholars of human rights. These scholars argue that seemingly                   
gender-neutral assumptions underlie political doctrines and social          
resources, and that these assumptions prevent the full realization of 
women’s rights. We then examine human rights advocates’ proposals 
of a gendered notion of rights and personhood, as a corrective to the 
gender-neutral frameworks which limit women’s access to resources. 
We conclude by examining the potential limits of both frameworks, 
and call for reconfiguration of gendered personhood in the United 
States and question the utility of such an atypical domestic violence 
3
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case in the IACHR. We argue that conceptualizing human rights                 
discourses and the law as cultural products that can shift and change – 
rather than unmoving and stable entities – allows for a more agentic 
understanding of how women and organizations can deploy rights 
frameworks in order to make positive social change (Merry 2006).  
 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION: 
THE GONZALES CASE  
 ‘Women’s’ issues such as rape in war, human trafficking, and 
female genital cutting are widely considered human rights violations 
and are the subject of many human rights campaigns. Domestic                 
violence, however, has not reached the threshold of a human rights 
violation despite its prevalence among women globally (MacKinnon 
2006). In the United States, domestic violence is largely                               
conceptualized as an act of violence perpetrated by an individual,               
rather than the state or state actors, thus not reaching the standard of 
a human rights violation (Merry 2006).  
 Jessica Gonzales fought this standard and filed suit against 
the town of Castle Rock, Colorado, the Castle Rock Police                           
Department, and the three individual officers that she had spoken to 
throughout the night of her daughters’ disappearance for failure to 
enforce her restraining and violation of her due process rights. The 
case was dismissed and on appeal, the 10th Circuit Court, sitting en 
banc, found subsequent evidence for a procedural due process claim 
and but affirmed the District Court of Colorado, that the individual 
officers could not be held liable for her daughters’ deaths (Castle Rock 
v. Gonzales 2005). When the case reached the Supreme Court, the 
10th Circuit Court’s opinion was reversed. As evidenced by the                 
opinions of the lower and Supreme Courts, the state cannot be held 
liable for a violent act committed against an individual (Castle Rock v. 
Gonzales 2005).  
 Despite the conceptualization of violence against women as 
an individual problem rather than a cultural one in the United States, 
the statistics paint a different picture. The United States has among 
the highest rates in the industrial world for rape, domestic violence, 
and spousal murder. Between 25 to 50 percent of all women over the 
age of 18 will experience domestic violence at some point during their 
lives (Tjaden and Thoennes 2000). Of all the women murdered in the 
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United States, 40 to 50 percent of them were killed by a husband or 
boyfriend (Campbell et al. 2003). Despite these staggering numbers, 
the United States is rarely discussed as a state that needs human rights 
intervention (Armaline, Glasberg and Purkayastha 2011). Part of the 
reason why the United States and its’ citizens may fail to conceptualize 
domestic violence as a human rights violation may be due to the                   
privileging of gender-neutral discourses over discussions that                  
foreground gendered inequalities as connected to violence against 
women.  
 In the last twenty years, however, domestic violence has                     
become one of the key organizing issues around which activists and 
scholars rally that women’s rights are human rights (Bunch 1990). 
This issue specifically indexes the key critiques of liberalism, as                
domestic violence is often considered private and individual rather 
than systemic and group-based. Human rights activist Charlotte 
Bunch demonstrates this viewpoint, arguing that:  
 
 Significant numbers of the world’s population are 
routinely subject to torture, starvation, terrorism, 
humiliation, mutilation, and even murder simply 
because they are female. Crimes such as these 
against any group other than women would be 
recognized as a civil and political emergency as 
well as a gross violation of the victims’ humanity. 
Yet, despite a clear record of deaths and                            
demonstrable abuse, women’s rights are not                 
commonly classified as human rights (1990:486).  
 
Bunch also notes that no matter women’s differences by race, class, 
sexuality, age, or ablebodiness, violence is a common experience of 
women throughout the world, constituting a grave violation of their 
human rights to life and liberty (1990:489). Following the lead of their 
non-Western counterparts, scholars in the United States have begun 
to theorize about the utility of the current frameworks for domestic 
violence intervention (Stark 2007;  Libal and Parekh 2009). For                    
example, Evan Stark (2007) critiques the prevailing ‘protect and                    
punish’ model of domestic violence intervention for its lack of                    
attention to structural causes of widespread violence against women. 
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He argues that domestic violence can be molded to fit the dominant 
liberal notion of personhood by focusing on the ways in which               
systematic violence against women restricts women’s access to the 
rights and resources of citizens. However, the only legislation to                
directly address the structural underpinnings of domestic violence 
against women – CEDAW – continues to flounder in Congress. The 
individual-level approach utilized in the Violence Against Women Act 
(VAWA) remains the only mechanism of civil redress for battered 
women in the United States.  
 
Liberalism: Feminist and Human Rights Critiques  
 Liberalism is the political philosophy which underlies many 
modern democracies. According to liberalism, a person is                            
conceptualized as bound, autonomous, and self-determining. The              
relationship between the state and the individual is characterized by a 
social contract in which the individual allows the state particular rights 
and thus the state is granted power over individuals through the social 
contract. The liberal individual is a contentious assumption. Feminist 
and human rights scholars argue that politically liberal assumptions of 
personhood exclude marginalized people, as individuals or as groups, 
from accessing rights. These critiques of liberalism are shared by 
Western feminist scholars across many disciplines as well as scholars 
in the human rights literature. Western feminists highlight the                     
masculinist, raced and classed underpinnings of the liberal person 
(Crenshaw 1991; Fraser 1989; hooks 2000; MacKinnon 2006; Roberts 
1997). Human rights scholarship points to the liberal person as a 
Western construct embodied in human rights discourse which                      
privileges a particular notion of personhood and favors some rights 
over others (Pateman 1988; Pollis and Schwab; MacKinnon 2006; 
Stark 2007; Nussbaum 1999; Binion 1995; Jaggar 1983). Many of these 
shared critiques center around concerns that an individual may not 
identify themselves as an autonomous entity, appeals to rights may be 
based on group membership not on a relationship to the state, and 
that some rights that people seek are group rights rather than                          
individual rights (Bulbeck 1998; Cowan, Dembour and Wilson 2001; 
Gedalof 1999; Merry 2006).  
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Law and the United States  
 For scholars of legal issues in the United States, the liberal 
framework is problematic as it is inherently masculine. Feminist      
scholars argue that the liberal distinction between the public and                        
private in U.S. law is one of the key ways in which the state ignores 
women’s rights. Fraser (1989) calls the modern state a ‘public                      
patriarchy’ whereby women can only claim rights when they enter the 
public sphere, from which they have historically been excluded.                
However, the ways in which women routinely interact with the state 
and state-run institutions forms a second-tiered and disadvantaged 
system of subjecthood: women are conceptualized as dependent and 
not as ’ rights bearing beneficiaries …[and] possessive                                         
individuals’ (Fraser 1989:153). This separation of public and private, 
many argue, is what allows law enforcement to disregard women’s 
rights by dismissing or policing them. Until recently, police officers 
would not respond the same way to domestic violence as other types 
of assault because it was considered a ‘private family matter’ (Sack 
2004; Binion 1995; Peter 2006). Rape has also been conceptualized as 
a private act, out of the purview of state responsibility, which invites 
pathologizing, victim-blaming rhetoric, and individual-level                                 
explanations in lieu of structural analyses and solutions (MacKinnon 
1989).  
 When women do enter the criminal justice system, they are 
often treated differently because of gendered understandings about 
domestic life. Chesney-Lind and Pasko (2004) find that young women 
are more likely to encounter the criminal justice system for crimes 
such as running away, and are often treated more ‘lenient’ sentences 
such as house arrest. This is a flawed approach as many of these ‘run-
aways’ leave home because of violence or abuse, and are then                      
punished with a return to an abusive home life.  
 
Identity and Agency  
 Liberalism assumes a bounded, static, and rational subject, 
which many feminists argue is problematically masculine. They argue 
that women have different relationships which form their identity and 
agency in different ways than men. Some early psychological work 
(Chodorow 1978; Gilligan 1982) argues that women’s identities are 
other-oriented and are less bound and individualistic than men’s           
7
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identity. Sex-difference theorists (Irigaray 1985, 1992) argue that       
women biologically and culturally share the universal qualities of the 
feminine: the fluid, leaky, nurturing, etc. The liberal assumptions of 
personhood as autonomous, bounded, and rational, then, do not 
match up to women’s identities which are much more communal and 
other-oriented.  
 The work of feminist psychologists and sex difference                   
theorists has been heavily critiqued by those who argue that identity 
and agency are formed in relationship to social structure. Collins 
(1990) argues that black women have a history of matriarchy and               
orientation to the community rather than to an individual. Racialized 
and classed positions create structural inequalities that constrain some 
women’s ability to act effectively in political and social spheres that 
privilege white and upper-middle class persons (hooks 2000; Roberts 
1997; Crenshaw 1991). These scholars agree that assumptions of 
bounded and rational individuals in social and political thought                
marginalize women, though they argue that non-white and lower class 
women are at a greater disadvantage, and that the root cause of the 
marginalization is structural rather than something essential (either 
biological or psychological about womanhood).  
 Gedolf (1999) argues that assumptions of the autonomous 
bounded individual are not the best framework to analyze rights, 
rights claims, or identity. This is not to enforce an essentialized notion 
of women as less rational nor a perspective of sex difference as                
women being organically more fluid than men. Instead, Gedolf                 
advocates for a contextualized and structural understanding of                  
women’s identity and positionality (1999). In the same vein, cultural 
feminists argue that we must attend to the ‘situated-ness’ of women 
within culture and structure in order to understand how women’s 
identities are formed. These scholars argue that the human rights               
discourse fails to capture the rights of groups or the experience of the 
individual that cannot be divorced from group positioning. These             
critics argue that the prevailing human rights doctrine staunchly                  
subscribes to the notion that autonomous individuals are the                      
possessors of rights, rather than individuals with fluid identities and 
multiple ties, or groups of people.  
 There are obvious linkages between the gendered critiques of 
human rights and the critiques of human rights by non-Western              
8
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scholars. The critiques include the privileging of civil and political 
rights over social cultural and economic, assuming the existence of 
particular political structures, and conceptualizing personhood,               
agency, and identity in Western ways (see Brems 1997 for a review on 
feminist and cultural critiques of human rights). Non-Western                        
feminists argue that women are not bounded individuals; that agency 
and identity are more fluid and porous, and human rights frameworks 
fail to capture the relational qualities of personhood (Bulbeck 1998; 
Gedalolf 1999). The separation between public and private is not only 
seen as privileging men’s access to human rights instruments and               
enforcement. It also imposes a Western framework onto states,                 
communities, and cultures that do not define personhood as an                 
autonomous, bounded individual (Pateman 1988; MacKinnon 2006; 
Stark 2007; Nussbaum 1999; Binion 1995; Jaggar 1983).  
 These notions of what constitutes an individual and who may 
have rights and who does not, are intensely debated between                
advocates of cultural relativists and universalist approaches to human 
rights issues. If human rights are indeed universal, then that allows for 
the authors and enforcers of those rights to privilege some rights over 
others. The debates between cultural relativism and universalism have 
been cast in very stark terms, and those social scientists who stand 
resolutely on one side or another have been critiqued by feminists 
who argue that there is certainly a more nuanced and coherent way to 
look at the relationship between individual and group’s rights and 
power.  
 
Law and Rights as Culture  
 Perhaps the best entre’ into the tensions between rights and 
the law is to understand that human rights and the law are both                 
culturally situated discourses. While culture is usually seen in the 
Western world as backward, anti-feminist, and opposing human 
rights, some scholars have argued that we must understand legal and 
rights frameworks as themselves cultural products (Coomaraswamy 
2001; Cowan, Debor and Wilson 2001; Merry 1990; 2006). Culture, in 
this instance is a process of meaning making which is dynamic,               
contested, unbounded and interpretable (Cowan, Debor and Wilson 
2001; Merry 1990; 2006).  
 This view of both rights and law as cultural discourse allows 
9
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for a critical interrogation of power at multiple levels and allows for a 
conceptualization of both individual and/or group agency. This                 
perspective acknowledges that ‘human rights are socially                         
constructed and…are rooted in political, economic, and cultural               
power relations’ (Coomaraswamy 2001:13). But we should also                       
recognize that people may take up particular legal and or rights                     
discourses to make their claims successful (Polletta 2006; Merry 1990; 
2006). While certainly not all people have the same access to particular 
claims, there is certainly creative room that groups or individuals may 
deploy to challenge or broaden notions of what is a human right and 
what constitutes a legal claim. Merry argues that people develop a 
‘legal consciousness’ through their understandings of their selfhood, 
moral order, and culture (1990; 2006). For human rights frameworks 
to be successfully adopted, Merry finds that people must 1) be willing 
to take up the framework, 2) have that framework and or their claims 
recognized by powerful institutions and 3) be able to translate the 
framework in ways that are meaningful on the ground (Merry 2006). 
  
‘WOMAN AS…’: PERSONHOOD, RIGHTS AND THE CASE 
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE  
 While scholars have argued that women’s ability to access 
rights has been restricted by the seemingly gender-neutral tenants of 
liberalism, gendered scripts are key to accessing institutional and                  
judicial resources (Hamilton 2010). A brief historical analysis reveals 
that women have strategically used gendered identities in order to 
make positive social change. The history of domestic violence                    
activism in the United States provides examples of the changing                
definitions of women’s personhood and subsequent access to rights 
from the state. In the United States, women have only been able to 
access freedom from systematic violence if they inhabit a certain                
status: woman as wife, mother, worker, etc. In many cases, this was a 
strategic decision in order to secure funding or increase political               
viability. We show how these strategic deployments of identity are 
used agentically to access rights and to make legal changes. However, 
we recognize that the gendered scripts may be limited in terms of 
which women may readily access and successfully deploy them.  
 
 
10
Societies Without Borders, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol7/iss1/3
S. Missari & C. Zozula/Societies Without Borders 7:1 (2012) 52-73 
~62~ 
© Sociologists Without Borders/Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2012 
Woman as Wife  
 Even though the term ‘domestic violence’ is relatively new, 
intimate partner violence has a long history in the United States. In 
the 18th century, church courts would decide on cases of rape or             
domestic violence, almost always preferring to keep the family          
together (Pleck 1987). ‘Good’ wives were those who stayed with their 
husbands, no matter how severe the beatings. Despite the submission 
of personal integrity to the sanctity of the family, early colonial law 
acknowledged marital violence and passed the first laws prohibiting it. 
The Massachusetts Body of Liberties of the Massachusetts Bay                  
Colony passed one such law against wife beating that stated, ‘Everie 
marryed woeman shall be free from bodilie correction or stripes by 
her husband, unlesse it be in his owne defence upon her                          
assault’ (Pleck 1987:21-22). The 19th century brought increased                 
activism against wife beating. Both the feminist and temperance 
movements saw wife beating as a social problem. Whereas the                 
temperance movement saw alcohol as the root cause, feminists saw 
the hierarchical structure of marriage and divorce laws as the chief 
facilitator of violence against women (Schneider 2000). The discourse 
of wife beating as a symptom of alcoholism became the dominant 
frame, and shelters for wives of alcoholics were created.  
 
Woman as Mother  
 Through the rest of the 19th and early 20th century, the                 
critique of patriarchal marriage subsided and the first formal social 
agencies to deal with family violence were created, primarily as aid to 
children. Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (SPCCs) 
were founded by members of the upper class and were often used as 
places of refuge for women experiencing domestic violence, who 
would gain entry by making claims as mothers in the name of safety 
for their children. SPCCs served a secondary purpose as well. They 
were largely a mechanism of social control of ‘disorderly’ immigrant 
families who were a threat to middle class values and national stability 
(Gordon 1988) Domestic violence was one of the many problems 
associated with poor immigrant communities warranting formal                 
intervention.  
 Despite formal intervention (albeit, indirectly), many women 
remained ambivalent about the individual ‘right’ to freedom from    
11
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violence throughout this period. Given the choice of protesting               
beatings and being left homeless with no source of income, many 
women chose to stay with abusive husbands. It was not until (certain) 
women had the possibility independence from their husband through 
outside employment, divorce and remarriage, birth limitation, and 
government aid to single mothers did the concept of the entitlement 
to freedom from violence become realized (Gordon 1988:256).  
 
Woman as Worker  
 It was not until 1971 that the first shelter dedicated solely to 
aiding battered women opened in the United States. The shelter 
movement of the 1970s paved the way for discussions of the scope of 
the problem of domestic violence and the need for federal                         
intervention. Initial discussions of a national domestic violence policy 
were initiated in 1990 when the Violence Against Women Act 
(VAWA) was introduced by then Senator Joseph Biden. In the                   
following years, feminist organizations, along with a coalition of civil 
rights and worker’s rights groups organized to lobby Congress in             
favor of the Act (Gelb 2003).  
 The Commerce Clause, which grants federal intervention into 
any activity that obstructs interstate commerce, was utilized in VAWA 
after four years of witness testimony and data gathering that                       
sufficiently demonstrated the effect of violence on women’s ability to 
participate fully in the national economy as workers and consumers. 
Statistics show that homicide is the leading cause of death for women 
at work, almost half of all victims of rape lose their jobs, and batterers 
frequently harass their partners at work (Goldscheid 2000:116-117). 
Reports also state that gender-based violence not only costs millions 
in health-care costs per year but costs employers an estimated $3 to $5 
billion as a result of absenteeism due to domestic violence annually 
(Biden 2000:22). The use of women’s roles as workers and consumers 
is the first alternative to the traditional wife or mother frame for 
claimsmaking, by privileging the relationship of the ungendered but 
productive citizen to the state.  
 Certainly the roles of a woman as a mother and the toll that 
domestic violence takes on children’s lives are important issues to  
discuss. We briefly cite these examples to show how central                        
relationships are to the notion of womanhood, and to argue that the 
12
Societies Without Borders, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol7/iss1/3
S. Missari & C. Zozula/Societies Without Borders 7:1 (2012) 52-73 
~64~ 
© Sociologists Without Borders/Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2012 
provision of such evidence comes from a structured history of how 
women’s rights are mobilized in the United States. This trend is     
potentially harmful and limiting to policy 
 
JESSICA GONZALES: GENDER NEUTRAL OR PRIVILEGED 
WOMANHOOD?  
 
Domestic Cases  
 Jessica Gonzales’ motherhood is central to the symbolic               
resonance of her case, since her daughters were the primary victims of 
her husband’s violence. Despite this, the arguments made by her               
lawyers at the state and federal level are surprisingly absent of                  
gendered issues. These issues include the state’s duty to enforce               
restraining orders, the duty of the state to protect citizens against             
private acts, and due process. In her U.S. Supreme Court case,                 
Gonzales’ attorneys argued that her right to equality under the law was 
violated because the lack of enforcement of her restraining order, 
which follows the historic pattern of inadequate or non-response of 
police officers in domestic violence calls.  
 The issue of state responsibility has also been central to the 
limits of the duty of law enforcement’s to protect private citizens from 
violence. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services 
(1989), state responsibility for protecting private citizens was deemed 
conditional, even when the state has had some level of prior 
knowledge of potential risk of violence. The facts of DeShaney are as 
follows. Four-year-old Joshua DeShaney, who was hospitalized after 
his father beat him, was released to his father’s custody three days 
after leaving the hospital. The case against his father was subsequently        
dismissed, but the Department of Social Services checked in on             
Joshua and his father multiple times from 1983 and 1984, in which no               
action was taken despite suspicion of continued abuse. In March of 
1984, Joshua’s father beat him so badly that Joshua suffered extensive 
brain damage leaving him permanently disabled. Even though the       
Department of Social Services was monitoring the family at the time 
of Joshua’s abuse, the court ruled that the state did not have any 
‘affirmative duty’ to protect Joshua as he was not technically under 
state custody at the time of his beating. The majority opinion held that 
‘[t]he affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State’s knowledge 
13
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of the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of intent to 
help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his                      
freedom to act on his behalf’ (DeShaney v. Winnebago County                     
Department of Social Services 1989). Similarly, the existence of a            
restraining order in the Gonzales cases failed to meet the ‘special                 
relationship’ requirement, adding that such a ruling could result in a 
landslide of public expectations of the enforcement of private citizen’s 
rights (Combs 2006).  
 This gender neutral language in determining the relationship 
between the state and the citizen, and the duties attached is markedly 
different from the emotional language in documents provided to the 
IACHR. We argue that the absence of the recognition of the gendered 
nature of the majority of domestic violence cases in the United States 
hinders the ability of the state to responsibly enforce domestic                        
violence law and not be subject to more general (and over-
exaggerated) issues of private citizens’ rights.  
 
IACHR and Womanhood  
 In the case before the IACHR, Gonzales’ counsel claimed 
that her right to special protection for mothers and children (as                   
stipulated in Article VII of the American Declaration) was violated. 
Additionally, petitioners claimed that the United States violated               
Gonzales’ right to due process by failing to protect her daughters 
from domestic violence and their inadequate investigation of her 
daughter’s murders (Lenahan v. United States 2010). For example, an 
amicus curiae brief submitted on behalf of Gonzales concludes with 
the following statement:  
 
 By failing to protect women from violence and 
hold their batters accountable the United States 
flouts the American Declaration and basic                
precepts of international law which secure the 
right to life and to family life (Chaudior 2008:32).  
 
The consequences of failure to enforce Gonzales’ restraining order 
may be implicitly read into this conclusion: Gonzales lost the right to 
‘family life.’ Omitted are other notions of human rights which are         
certainly violated when we conceptualize domestic violence as a                 
14
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human rights violation.  
 It is important to note that among the seven claims against 
the United States, the IACHR could not find sufficient evidence to 
conclude that the U.S. violated: the ‘Right to protection of honor,   
personal reputation and private and family life’ (Article V) and ‘Right 
to a family and to protection thereof (Article VI) (Organization of 
American States 1948). It is important to contrast this with Article 
VII: ‘Right to protection for mothers and children,’ which the United 
States violated. In this example, the specifically gendered conception 
of the rights of mothers and children were upheld, while the gender-
neutral right to protection was not.  
 The Gonzales case leaves domestic violence and human rights 
activists with several questions to be explored. First, how can                       
challenges to existing laws incorporate a gendered picture of a person, 
without automatically assuming wife and motherhood as the primary 
relationship that legitimates attention from state and international 
bodies? Furthermore, how do we incorporate a gendered                              
understanding of personhood which would help us frame women’s 
rights as human rights? These questions should be confronted when 
shaping future policy and we suggest that the potential for an                        
alternative construction exists within the human rights framework  
 
DISCUSSION  
 As stated above, feminists have vigorously debated the utility 
of liberal personhood for the realization of human rights as women’s 
rights (Nussbaum 1999; Okin 1999). One of the most widely used 
critiques argues that liberalism largely ignores the private sphere, 
where the state has historically had a policy of nonintervention. In 
contrast to this, in the documents submitted to the IACHR, the                
complainant is framed as a woman very much situated in her                             
relationships. While the Gonzales case has been touted as the first                 
individual complaint of a human rights violation against the United 
States by a domestic violence survivor, it certainly follows the historic 
pattern of highlighting women’s roles as mothers and wives, instead of 
women as citizens. While this may be a strategic tactic on the part of 
the ACLU, we argue that this choice of a test case has the potential to 
discursively and political exclude women who are not mothers, as well 
as women who suffer from domestic violence in relationships that are 
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outside of marriage (e.g. as partners in heterosexual, lesbian, bisexual, 
trans or queer relationships, or with an abuser who is not an intimate 
sexual partner).  
 At the same time, we find the continued presumption of a 
neutral citizen in legalese also problematic. In arguments about the 
reformation of laws in the United States to provide adequate                        
protection, the privileged relationship is between the state and the 
citizen, and the citizen with another citizen. The citizen has                          
historically had a male face (and body) which serves as the default for 
determining which rights are ‘special’ (MacKinnon 2006). The utter 
absence of a gendered notion of personhood could be potentially 
problematic in that it does not take into account power differentials. 
Too often, enforcement of laws in domestic violence situations are 
predicated on the individual discretion of the police, judges, and social 
service workers. Failure to account for how gender stereotypes and 
institutionalized sexism play into differential enforcement of domestic 
violence laws leaves us with an unhealthy concept of domestic                   
violence as indistinguishable from other acts of violence committed 
by one private citizen against another.  
 How then, can we integrate an understanding of gender into 
the United States legal discourse? How then, can we create a discourse 
in the United States and internationally, which does not equate a 
women with a particular identity which excludes women without                 
children, women who are not married, women who suffer from                
violence that is not as sensational as Jessica Gonzales.  
 For these answers, we return to our discussion of law as a 
cultural discourse. In the United States, the discourse of human rights 
violations tends to be focused on what’s happening ‘out there’ rather 
than ‘in our own backyard’ (Armaline, Glasberg, Pukayastha 2011). To 
develop a human rights consciousness requires a cultural shift in terms 
of how we see ourselves. We argue that this cultural shift could start 
with the United States signing the Convention to Eliminate                           
Discrimination Against Women. Such an institutional and structural 
level shift allows for a consciousness and a utility of claims-making. At 
the macro-level, it also provides an institutionalized ‘check’ on the 
United States by other nations and by non-governmental                         
organizations.  
 Having an institutionalized record of a commitment to              
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women’s rights means that rights-consciousness and the access to      
recourse may be strengthened. Merry (2006) argues that human rights 
are ‘made in the vernacular;’ that broad universal ideas about rights 
and identity are tenable when they have discursive power in a local 
context. As we see in the brief review of women’s rights in the United 
States, groups drew from powerful cultural conceptualizations of 
rights to make broad social changes.   
 For instance, the VAW was drafted on the basis of women as 
workers and interstate commerce, but the discursive understanding 
and practical deployment of the VAW Act does not draw on these 
notions (Missari 2011). The legal basis or state commitment to a                  
particular set of values may also open up the discussion to rights that 
are seemingly excluded from the formal discourse. Falcón (2009) 
shows how domestic groups were able to deploy a treaty from the 
1960’s to make claims about gendered and racial inequality in issues of 
reproductive justice. She found that The Center for Reproductive 
Rights was able to use the UN’s review process on the US’s                         
compliance with the International Convention to Eliminate All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination, which the US ratified in 1994, make rights 
claims about women of color’s access to sexual education,                                
reproductive rights, and sexual health. So then, once a treaty is ratified 
or a commitment is made at a national level, groups and concerns 
which may have been ignored can draw from both powerful and               
recognizable discourses.  
 Making human rights in the vernacular does not ensure that 
all claims will be successful or will as readily conform to gendered 
scripts that hold power. We still need a way to understand the                     
differences and similarities of women in violent relationships. We 
have argued previously that while domestic violence is a problem for 
all kinds of women, the particular experience of legal access is largely 
dependent on class, race, culture and other structured positions. We 
argue, as Martha Nussbaum has, that the conception of liberal                       
personhood frequently used in domestic litigation and legislation is 
‘not individualistic enough’ (1999:63) to account for women’s unique              
experiences as the primary victims of this type of patterned violence. 
Following Nussbaum’s assertion, we argue that the ways in which     
domestic violence claims are framed are not individualistic enough, in 
both U.S. and international discourse. Therefore, a gender-neutral 
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approach ignores women’s experiences as individuals who are                    
routinely faced with a specific type of violence precisely because they 
are women. At the same time, using a specifically gendered approach 
ignores women who cannot make claims based on their position                     
within the traditional heteronormative family, their conceptualization 
of their identity, and their structured position which may hinder            
access to resources.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 Despite its recent victory in the IACHR, we do not yet know 
if the Gonzales case will have any meaningful effect on the                             
conceptualization of domestic violence as a human rights violation in 
the United States. As we have shown, following the history of                     
successful intervention, those involved in the case have efficiently     
utilized specific rhetorical devices depending on the context: gender 
neutral in United States courts and specifically gendered in the 
IACHR. However, these two viewpoints have remained distinct in 
their approach to justice for survivors of domestic violence and have 
yet to come to a mutual point of understanding, where courts,                     
lawyers, and activists can conceptualize a woman as a gendered person 
in a more inclusive sense.  
 We argue that structural and cultural changes, along with      
persistent and consistent action on the ground will allow for more 
inclusive modes of domestic violence claims. The ratification of 
CEDAW would provide women in the United States with the access 
and power to deploy human rights claims in domestic violence                      
charges. A shift in consciousness from the liberal individual to the 
gendered individual will also be crucial. In order to implement this we 
follow Nussbaum’s suggestion for the integration of feminist critiques 
and the individual dignity of people, regardless of role. Using this 
framework, a domestic violence survivor could make claims of a               
violation of her human right to bodily integrity as an individual, while 
recognizing that this specific type of violence is ‘gendered’ in its                    
ubiquity in the lives of women regardless of context, culture, and             
social position.  
 With an understanding of human rights and the law as                     
cultural discourses which can change and shift through interaction 
with people and groups, we can proceed to conceptualize a way in 
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which woman can make rights claims in meaningful ways. By                     
understanding women as differentially situated due to class, culture, 
nationality, citizenship, and the relationships and identities that are 
meaningful to them, then we can shy away from making one grand 
claim for what constitutes women’s rights and the violation of those 
rights. Understanding that rights consciousness is institutional, and 
that state actors must accept the discourses and rights claims as valid, 
some institutional changes must be made. In the United States, the 
ratification of CEDAW is integral to holding the state accountable for 
claims of women’s rights abuses as well as for developing a human 
rights consciousness in the United States. We need more people like 
Jessica Lenahan to bring their cases to legal institutions claiming                  
human rights violations. We need a cacophony of women and their 
experiences in order to create a multitude of workable, meaningful, 
and successful frameworks for ensuring women’s rights.  
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